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ABSTRACT 
At the core of the crisis marked by its magnitude, credit risk turned to become a powerful catalyst. The objective of this 
paper is mainly to follow up the evolution of the credit risk at the Jordanian market during the recent economic and 
financial international crisis. Based on the linear discriminant model Z-Score and KMV structural model, we recognize the 
increase in the credit risk during the crisis period. On the whole, the confrontation between models highlights the robust 
correlation between the accounting results of a company and its market value. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the 2007 financial and economic crisis, the world economy has gone through a time of crisis characterized by 
instability. This crisis is exceptionally noteworthy with no other comparably similar crisis since the 1930s. Markets are 
becoming ever more open and interconnected, and they are being exposed to an increased risk of contagion. At the 
heart of this financial crisis, credit risk has constituted a powerful catalyst. Credit risk conventionally corresponds to a 
situation where borrowers are incapable of honoring commitments with their creditors. There are two possible 
outcomes. Either the company negotiates a modification to its terms of credit (e.g., staggering payments, modifying 
rates, etc.), or the company is liquidated (Blazy et al., 2013). In addition, it is possible to consider credit risk as being a 
case where the financial situation of the borrower deteriorates, which then increases the probability of liquidity risk, 
especially when the market value of the company sharply declines (Kharoubi et al., 2013). For credit institutions, it is 
essential to control this risk, to ensure it remains in proportions that are sufficiently low to avoid not only losses on their 
credit portfolios, but  also an increase in their cost of equity capital. To achieve this, the bank portfolio must be regularly 
examined in order to determine if the yield complies with expectations and if the level of risk remains within acceptable 
limits.  
In period of instability, such as the one experienced by many developed countries since 2007, credit risk has become a 
topic of concern for credit institutions, whose bankruptcies have strangely increased. For researchers, this crisis has 
revealed questions not only on banking methods that have been adopted for measuring their credit risk, but also on the 
contagion of the latter (Collins et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2018; Ters et al., 2018).  
Unlike developed countries where financial products are widely used, the development of financial products remains 
limited in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Indeed, since the 1990s, the countries of the MENA region 
have, for the most part, proceeded in opening their economies and in liberalizing their banking system through structural 
changes, all while adopting international regulation standards and international financial and banking standards. The 
banking market in Jordan has not been kept away from this development. This market captures our attention insofar as 
it presents some specificity on a regional scale. Jordan is an extraordinary, Near-East country because it benefits from a 
political stability that generates economic activity in a region filled with instability. Since the 1990s, Jordan has adopted 
a policy of liberalization through a series of reforms aimed at improving the performance of its banking and financial 
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system, at attracting capital to ensure the financing of its development and to correct imbalances in its economy (Brack, 
2012). This characteristic gives Jordan a degree of strong international openness for economic and financial relations, 
remarkable on a regional scale. For example, according to the KOF Economic Globalization Index, its level of openness 
exceeds that of Egypt. Furthermore, its index has exceeded that of the United States since 2001 and has also shown a 
level similar to that of France these past years (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. KOF Globalization index  
 
Source: KOF Swiss Economic Institute 
 
At the same time, the regulation of its banking system has been greatly inspired by the prudential standards 
recommended by the Basel Committee. Moreover, liberalizing the banking system and opening the economy has made 
Jordan more prone to international crises. The contagion of the American-born crisis to Europe and then to the 
neighboring countries of the South has clearly had effects that go beyond what was predictable. On the Jordanian market, 
the outcome of the 2008 crisis was the turnaround of the credit cycle to the private sector (Figure 2). The Jordanian 
credit market has been marked by an increase from 4.1% in 2007 to 8.5% in 2011 in non-performing loans to the balance 
sheet total (Figure 3).  
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Figure 2.       Figure 3. 
Credit provided to the private sector (% by GDP)   Evolution of non-performing loans (%) 
 
Source: World Bank    Source: International Monetary Fund 
A possible explanation is the decrease in profitability in Jordanian banks: from 15% in 2006 to 8% in 2012 (Central Bank 
of Jordan). At the same time, the market value of Jordanian companies listed on the stock market started to sharply 
decline beginning in 2007 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. General Market Index (%) 
 
Source: Amman Stock Exchange 
Despite the deterioration of Jordanian financial system performance, the banking sector remains very stable. This is 
illustrated by a Liquidity Coverage Ratio of 159% and a solvency ratio of 19%, levels which are much greater than those 
set by Basel Committee standards. Between a remarkable level of stability and deteriorating financial system 
performance, this paper questions the impact of the policy of openness adopted by the Jordanian banking authorities 
on the evolution of credit risk, particularly in the recent context of the international crisis. The Jordanian market has not 
currently received any empirical analysis of its credit risk during the crisis period. To respond to this gap, this paper 
attempts to contextualize the evolution of the perception of credit risk. In order to illustrate the diversity of measures of 
risk that credit institutions currently use, this paper then conducts a detailed examination of common approaches to 
these measures in regards to companies listed on the stock market. The first approach is purely statistical and is founded 
in the financial business field. Altman’s Z-score model is based on accounting data that are unique to each company. The 
second approach can be qualified as dynamic. It integrates the financial market by taking into consideration the market-
business interaction in the assessment of credit risk. This paper illustrates this through the Portfolio Manager model. 
This type of connection enables an analysis of the indirect effect of the crisis on the Jordanian market through the credit 
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risk measured by the two other approaches. The second part of this paper presents the data and the methodology 
adopted in order to analyze and interpret the results. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Evolution of the perception of credit risk 
Insofar as the core business of banks is to take risks to increase profits, there is obviously great incentive to make such a 
process more effective. In this context, measuring credit risk represents an intrinsic step in a bank institution’s portfolio 
management. Financial innovations, which are the essential engine of financial change, have undoubtedly enabled the 
development of methods for measuring credit risk. This evolution has been influenced by several factors: a great increase 
in the number of bankruptcies worldwide, an increase in financial disintermediation by large companies, a more 
competitive credit market, the declining value in real assets and collateral, and sharp growth of off-balance sheet 
instruments (Altman and Saunders, 1998).  
Beyond these elements, implementing the Basel II Accord represents a fundamental step in shaping this methodological 
evolution. This accord has given banks the choice between two principal methods for calculating capital requirements 
relative to their credit risk. The first method consists in evaluating the risk in line with a so-called “standard” approach by 
relying on external assessments of credit risk. The second approach is based, for the first time, on adopting an internal 
rating system conducted by the bank itself, under the condition that the controlling authority gives its explicit approval 
(Maque et al., 2009). Since then, credit rating models that have been proposed by banks or services firms have become 
more sophisticated1. These models no longer focus uniquely on individual credit risk. They adopt a portfolio approach 
integrating the effect of the market into the risk assessment. This approach has been widely adopted, and it is today at 
the center of the majority of models measuring banks’ credit portfolio risk (Gadhoum et al., 2007). Moreover, linear 
discriminant models based on credit scoring also endure due not only to their simplicity but also to their objectivity. They 
represent a reference for practitioners and researchers (Li et al., 2010). We now present the linear discriminant approach 
followed by the structural approach. 
2.1.1. The “Z-Score” linear discriminant approach 
In a linear discriminant approach, failure prediction for a company is determined from accounting data. Thus, a group of 
variables that are considered by financial analysts as being the most representative of the soundness of a company must 
be integrated into the model. The objective is that the scoring should be statistically different for the companies that 
have a risk of failure and the companies that are sound. This allows for a clear distinction between the two categories. It 
should be noted that the scoring function based on linear discriminant analysis remains the most used method. By 
studying the contribution of each ratio, the final score that is obtained constitutes the probability that a company will go 
bankrupt and enables a clear classification.  
The founders of this approach are Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968). Beaver’s (1966) essential contribution consists in 
elaborating a unidimensional dichotomous classification allowing to distinguish the failing companies from the companies 
considered to be sound. Altman (1968) himself relied on a sample of sixty-six companies of which half were sound and 
the other half were failing. His model attracted particular interest in the sense that he succeeded in isolating 95% of 
enterprises one year before failure. Since then, many researchers have adopted the same methodology [Edmister (1972), 
Altman et Lavallée (1980), Atiya (2001), Grover (2001), Gadhoum et al. (2007), Altman et al. (2013)]. In his seminal model, 
Altman suggest that it is the profitability, liquidity and solvency ratios that represent the most significant indicators for 
predicting the failure of a company. The application of his model has led to the emergence of the following optimal 
scoring function: 
Z = 1,2 X1 + 1,4 X2 + 3,3 X3 + 0,6 X4 + 0,99 X5 
  
                                                          
1 Services firms offer outsourcing solutions for analysing risk, developing existing models or creating new models. 
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where, 
- the X1 ratio (Working capital / Total assets): by reporting net liquid assets to total capitalization, the ratio indicates the 
liquidity of the company.  
- the X2 ratio (Retained earnings / Total assets): it measures cumulative profitability over time. Thus, a company that has 
high reserves can use them to avoid bankruptcy if the company runs into any financial difficulties. Companies that have 
been recently started will be incapable of making up such reserves, which explains their financial weakness.  
- the X3 ratio (Earnings before interest and taxes / Total assets): it highlights the productivity of assets, abstracting from 
fiscal or debt factors. It is obviously a measure of the company’s profitability. 
- the X4 ratio (Market value equity / Book value of total debt): A company with high debt might become insolvent because 
of insufficient equity. 
- the X5 Capital-turnover ratio (Sales / Total assets): it indicates the generating efficiency of the company’s assets. 
Altman determines three zones according to the Z-score obtained from the calculation (Figure 5). Companies that have 
a score equal to or higher than 2.99 are so-called “sound” performing companies that carry a low level of credit risk, 
whereas all those that obtain a score inferior to 1.81 are companies with a high risk of failure. A score between 1.81 and 
2.99 is not sufficient to come to a conclusion; in this “ignorance zone”, some companies may be sound whereas others 
may carry risk. 
The descriptive statistical approach is indeed an essential tool for measuring credit risk, where the results are useful not 
only to credit-policy decision-makers but also to investors and market regulators (Taffler, 1982; Bardos, 1998; Shirata, 
1998; Altman et al., 2013). However, this “traditional” model is often qualified by authors as incomplete (see Barth et al., 
1998) and needs to be complemented with a supplementary method based on option pricing (Merton, 1974). 
Figure 5. Z-Score classification zone 
 
2.1.2. The KMV “Portfolio Manager” structural approach 
Parametric approaches are based on a theoretical model constructed with precise statistical modeling hypotheses. For 
banking institutions, these approaches play an increasingly greater role, notably following the implementation of the 
Basel II accord’s first pillar (i.e., capital requirements). Banks can now outsource diverse aspects concerning their rating 
systems, or even obtain internal risk analysis and management models, such as the one explained above.   
As a result, several models have been developed. Examples include the CreditMetrics model proposed by J.P.Morgan’s, 
the Portfolio Manager model proposed by Moody’s KMV, the CreditRisk+ model proposed by Crédit Suisse First Boston, 
and the CreditPortfolioView model proposed by McKinsey. Some models focus on the market value of the firm (e.g., 
Portfolio Manager and CreditMetrics) and others focus on assessment via the actuarial approach (e.g., CreditRisk+ and 
CreditPortfolioView). 
As its name suggests, the so-called structural approach focuses on the financial structure of the company. It analyzes this 
structure in the light of financial theory, as an options exchange of the company’s value. The use of this approach allows 
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for the assessment of the calculated probability of failure of a company so that it is equal to the historical percentage of 
empirically observed defaults (Gouriéroux and Tiomo, 2007). Our analysis focuses on the approach applied by Moody’s-
KMV. The Portfolio Manager model originates from the work of Black and Scholes and developed by Merton in 1974. 
Merton and Scholes rely on the principle that the shares of an indebted company are considered to be call options, with 
a fiscal level equal to the face value of the debt. In terms of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), they show the 
variation of stock prices of a company must reflect – by public or private information – its financial position and future 
performance. In line with the structural approach, the default risk thus corresponds to the probability that the market 
value of assets of a company should be inferior to the value of its bonds (liabilities). The Portfolio Manager model 
considers credit risk as a dynamic variable and not as a static parameter such as is the case in the Z-score model. In line 
with this model, credit risk corresponds to the probability of default. It is calculated through the following formula 
 
where,  
N(-) : normal distribution  
VA : market value of assets of firm A 
Xt : book value of the firm’s liabilities payable on date t 
σA : the firm’s asset volatility 
μ : expected return on assets of the firm2.  
According to the KMV model, market risk and credit risk are inseparable. In other terms, the increase in market risk – for 
example, due to the unexpected decrease in the company’s value – imply an increase of credit risk and vice versa (Jarrow, 
2000). The dynamics of the firm’s value allows to characterize the distance to default given by the number of standard 
deviations separating the asset value of the firm from the default point2. The latter corresponds to the critical asset value 
of the firm below which the company is failing, because the company can no longer satisfy its current debt obligations. 
In other words, the measure of the asset value of the firm will allow for the calculation of a default distance, presented 
as the distance between the expected value of assets at a set horizon (e.g., one year) and the default point. This distance 
to default represents a risk indicator that is then retranscribed in terms of default probability (Pt) (Figure 6). The asset 
value of the firm, its risk of activity, and its financial leverage are thus at the heart of the KMV structural approach 
(Gatfaoui, 2008). 
It is possible to formulate all of the critiques against the Moody’s KMV model that are traditionally reproached against 
the Black and Scholes model, which relies on Brownian motion. In this respect, the continuity of the trajectory of asset 
value of the company means that we know at any given moment how much these assets are worth and implies that the 
default event occurs continuously without surprise. Thus, one can say that the default risk has become predictable. On 
the other hand, this would not be true if switching processes were presented in the modeling of the trajectory of asset 
value (Kharoubi and Thomas, 2013).  
Also, the tools allowing to reduce asymmetry of information that is prevalent among shareholders and creditors are not 
taken into consideration in the Moody’s KMV model. This does not integrate the impact of the signal effect of external 
rating changes, which thus makes the moment of default totally opaque. 
 
                                                          
2 This model assumes that the returns on assets are normally distributed. 
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Figure 6. KMV Model’s – Illustration for Default  
 
Source : Crosbie and Bohn (2003) 
3. METHODS  
3.1 Comparative study of Z-Score and KMV models 
3.1.1 Sampling 
Our sample includes Jordanian companies in the industrial and services sectors listed on the stock market3. The period 
studied extends from 2006 – year preceding the beginning of the crisis – to 2011. The data necessary for the study are 
annual (i.e., end of the fiscal year). They are pulled from the database for the Jordanian stock market (ASE)3. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the information on the companies that became bankrupt during this period is not accessible. In 
line with the rating established by the ASE, the sample includes 99 companies, of which 41 are in the services sector and 
58 are in the industrial sector4.  
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
Graphs 1 and 2 represent a summary of the results produced by applying the Z-Score model on our sample. The 
procedure consists in proceeding with an annual Z-Score evaluation of the 99 companies over the six-year period studied. 
We distinguish three zones : the default zone (high credit risk), the ignorance zone and the low-risk zone (sound).  
In the services sector, we notice from one year to the next a decrease in the number of companies considered to be 
“sound” starting from 2008 (graph 1). This decrease is sensitive since, between the high point in 2007 and the latest 
observation (2011), the percentage of sound companies drops from 68% to 37%. The adverse effect is an increase in the 
number of companies having a high default risk, which rises from 15% in 2007 to 39% in 2011 among all of the companies 
in the services sector, as well as a more moderate but regular progression of companies in an undetermined situation.  
 
  
                                                          
3 The data for private companies not listed on the stock market are unavailable. 
4 Given its specificity, the banking and financial sector were not retained in our analysis. 
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Graphs 1 and 2. Rating of listed companies with the Z-Score model 
Graph 1                                                   Graph 2 
Services sector (%)                              Industrial sector (%) 
 
Source : Calculations by the author 
The industrial sector, which was already more exposed in 2006, is even more hit by the negative effects of the crisis since 
2007 (graph 2). If it is the first year, this translates into a sharp increase in the proportion of companies in an 
undetermined situation. Starting in 2008, the main adverse effect of the uninterrupted fall of the number of sound 
companies is the distinct increase of companies that could go bankrupt. In 2011, their proportion greatly surpassed that 
of sound companies (48% versus 34%). The result is more pronounced than in the services sector since the number of 
companies in an undetermined position does not increase over the global period.  
By grouping the results from both sectors (graph 3), we illustrate a clear global increase in credit risk of listed companies 
starting from 2007, in line with Altman’s linear discriminant model. In total, the number of companies with a default risk 
increased around 144% from 2007 to 2011.  
In parallel, we calculate the annual credit risk of the same companies with the Portfolio Manager structural model. In 
line with Elhadj ahmed et al. (2011), we consider the default point to be equal to the book value of short-term liabilities 
increased by half of the long-term liabilities. The application of this approach confirms the increasing evolution of credit 
risk during these past years in both sectors (graphs 4 and 5). 
Graph 3. Rating of listed companies with the Z-Score model (grouped data) 
Services and industry sectors 
 
Source : Calculations by the author 
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Moreover, in comparison of both methods, the curves representing the results obtained from the structural approach 
and the Z-Score discriminant analysis show an almost identical evolution, be it the services sector or the industry sector.  
Graphs 4 and 5. Evolution of credit risk with the Portfolio Manager and Z-Score models 
Graph 4                                                       Graph 5 
Services sector             Industry sector 
 
Source : Calculations by the author 
 
Finally, graph 6 which presents a summary of the results from the two grouped sectors obtained from Moody’s-KMV 
Portfolio Manager structural model and Altman’s linear discriminant model confirms the previous results.  
 
 
Graph 6. Evolution of credit risk of listed companies (group data) 
Services and industry sectors 
 
Source : Calculations by the author 
The analysis of these estimations show that the deterioration of the performance of companies does not depend solely 
on the company’s financial structure and global performance, but also on its market value. 
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Through the book information of Jordanian companies, we provided information on the default rate observed in our 
sample through Altman’s Z-Score and then compared with the probability of default based on market value via the 
structural model.  
Obviously, such a correspondence analysis only makes sense if both scales used make reference to a similar temporal 
horizon. After taking this element into account, the comparative analysis shows that both curves (Portfolio Manager and 
Z-Score) follow a close trend with slight gaps throughout the period of analysis (graphs 4, 5, and 6). In other words, the 
variations in these companies’ performance through the book analysis go hand in hand with the change in their stock 
market value during the period studied5.  
Following the outbreak of the 2007-2008 economic and financial crisis, the increase of credit risk explains the weakening 
of banking institutions in Jordan in view of the deterioration of their credit portfolio. This translates, on the one hand, 
into an increase of outstanding loans on the bank market (Figure 3) and, on the other hand, into a drop in banks’ incomes 
in the period of analysis. Moreover, the increase in credit risk has prompted banks to constrain their loan agreements, 
which explains the turnaround of the credit cycle to the private sector (Figure 2). 
In line with these results, we observed a general increase in credit risk, be it through accounting results or the stock 
market value of the companies studied. In this analysis, we can confirm a certain transparency in terms of information 
between the economic agents. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The assessment of credit risk, cyclical monitoring and the preventative and curative handling of unsecured loans are the 
keywords for a strategy seeking security and performance of a credit portfolio. Moreover, the management of credit risk 
has never been as important as in the past two decades because of the succession of crises (e.g., the Asian crisis in 1997, 
the Russian crisis in 1998, the Subprimes crisis in 2007, etc.) on one hand, and financial globalization encouraging 
phenomena of contagion.  
Since the 1990s, Jordan has opted for political liberalization of its banking and financial system. As a result, the banking 
sector has witnessed a great opening and strong development, but it has also become more sensitive to exterior shocks. 
Clearly, the economic crisis of the country has become more dependent on external economic and financial flows. Large, 
non-financial listed companies have not escaped this movement, making banks’ credit portfolios sensitive to the 
international opening of their clients. Since then, in an economic context deteriorated by the economic and financial 
crisis starting in 2007, it is interesting to observe the repercussions for the banking system, not through international 
interbank debt, but simply through the standard management framework in the domestic economy. Thus, even though 
Jordan appears far the origin of the American-born crisis, our study shows the increase of the credit risk of listed Jordanian 
companies during the financial and economic crisis, both through using Altman’s linear discriminant approach and 
integrating stock market value, as illustrated through the KMV-type structural model. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 (graph 1) 
 
Appendix 2 (graph 2) 
Z-Score Services sector 
 
Z-Score Industrial sector 
Year Safe Grey Distress 
 
Year Safe Grey Distress 
2006 63,41 14,63 21,95 
 
2006 0,57 0,28 0,16 
2007 68,29 17,07 14,63 
 
2007 0,5 0,41 0,09 
2008 51,22 19,51 29,27 
 
2008 0,47 0,21 0,33 
2009 48,78 21,95 29,27 
 
2009 0,4 0,29 0,31 
2010 48,78 24,39 26,83 
 
2010 0,38 0,29 0,33 
2011 36,59 24,39 39,02 
 
2011 0,34 0,17 0,48 
 
Appendix 3 (graph 3) 
 
Appendix 4 (graph 
4) 
 
Appendix 5 (graph 5) 
Z-Score Grouped data 
 
KMV Service 
 
KMV Industrial 
Year Safe Grey Distress 
 
Year CR 
 
Year CR 
2006 0,596 0,2222 0,1818 
 
2006 0,1146 
 
2006 0,0374 
2007 0,5758 0,3131 0,1111 
 
2007 0,1214 
 
2007 0,0472 
2008 0,4848 0,202 0,3131 
 
2008 0,1842 
 
2008 0,1339 
2009 0,4343 0,2626 0,303 
 
2009 0,1684 
 
2009 0,1624 
2010 0,4242 0,2727 0,303 
 
2010 0,1651 
 
2010 0,2353 
2011 0,3535 0,202 0,4444 
 
2011 0,266 
 
2011 0,2683 
 
Appendix 6 (graph 6) 
KMV Services and industrial sector 
Year CR KMV Mean  
2006 0,0760 
2007 0,0843 
2008 0,1591 
2009 0,1654 
2010 0,2002 
2011 0,2671 
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